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Abstract: In this paper optimal tax formulae are computed when con-
sumption of a commodity produces pollution. Then a test of the double
dividend hypothesis based on the shadow prices of those formulae is pro-
posed.
Resumen: En este artículo se calculan las fórmulas fiscales óptimas cuando
se consume un bien que contamina. Luego se propone una prueba de la
hipótesis del doble dividendo, una base en los precios sobre de dichas
fórmulas.
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1. Introduction
ince Pigou the main objective of tax policies when considering ex-
ternalities has been the correction of their negative effects on
optimality. The type of remedy proposed was the direct taxation of the
externality causing activity. For general externalities differential taxa-
tion would be needed requiring information about the damage and
the offender. This type of taxation is generally not feasible because of
the high cost of its implementation and because of informational con-
straints of several types, some of them causing incentive constraints.
These reasons make the economic literature look for a more appropri-
ate second best framework.
Diamond (1973) is aware of these problems and uses only uniform
taxes that do not need information about the differences in the pollu-
tion activity pursued by individuals. Green and Sheshinski (1976) ex-
tend the approach of Diamond (1973) by introducing a commodity re-
lated to the externality creating good. By taxation of the related good
additional control of the externality is provided. They show cases in
which it is better to tax or subsidythe related good than to tax directly
the externality creating good. Sometimes the optimal policy involves a
subsidy of a complement of the externality creating good. These results
are improved further by Balcer (1980) and Wijkander (1985).
Another line of research relating taxes and externalities begins
with Sandmo (1975) and Sandmo (1976). He considers the problem of
optimal collection of a given amount of tax revenue with one repre-
sentative consumer and when consumption of a commodity creates
externalities. He focusses on the optimal tax on the externality caus-
ing good. In the second paper he explores the problem of three com-
modities when one of them is related to the externality causing good.
The substitution effects are very important to the determination of
optimal taxes and also to the effect on the externality.
Closely related are Bovenberg and Goulder (1996), and Bovenberg
and van der Ploeg (1994). An optimal tax on externality creating com-
modities will have two parts. The first one corrects for the external-
ity. The other component will be a kind of Ramsey term for optimal
taxes. Also related are Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994) and Cremer,
Gahvari, and Ladoux (1998). The latter also discusses conditions for
the validity of the (called since Sandmo) additivity property where the
presence of pollution only alters the tax formula of the externality
creating good. We will also review this property in this paper.
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We will set the optimal tax problem of the government in which it
will be very important the way commodities relate to the externality
creating good and also how they relate to other commodities, even to
those not related to the externality creating good. The government
will also have other important objectives related to income distribu-
tion, efficiency of taxation, and tax collection. We will follow the meth-
odology of Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) to find optimal tax formulae in
economies with many agents. We extend their model to cover the case
in which consumption of some commodities causes externalities.
We analyze then the Double Dividend proposition. This proposi-
tion claims that a tax on externality creating goods reduces externali-
ties and also allows the reduction of distortions by using its revenue to
reduce, in a revenue neutral way, taxes on other commodities. We will
set a methodology inspired on Ahmad and Stern (1991) together with
our optimal tax problem to review and analyze this proposition. The
relevant literature on the double dividend is summarized by Goulder
(1995). (See also Bovenberg and van der Ploeg, 1994, and Bovernberg
and de Mooij, 1997.)
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model.
Section 3 computes the optimal tax formulae. Section 4 relates opti-
mal tax formulae with those arising from Pigouvian taxation. Section
5 presents our test for the double dividend hipothesis. Section 6 con-
cludes the paper with some final remarks.
2. The Model, Notation, and Main Assumptions
Let H be the finite set of consumers in the economy indexed by h.
They consume two types of goods, L tradable in the market and pollu-
tion which is not tradable.
Let p [ RL be the vector of producer prices and t [ RL be the vector
of commodity taxes. Then q = p + t [ RL is the vector of consumer
prices. For each h [ H, let mh be the unearned income of consumer h.
For each h [ H, let ch [ RL be h’s consumption of marketed goods. Let
z be the amount of pollution in the economy.
We assume that only the consumption of the commodity indexed
by 1 causes pollution and that pollution is produced depending on a
given technology  ( ) z f x h
h = S 1 . Thus we refer here to what Meade (1952)
calls atmosphere externalities. Meaning those types that have a nega-
tive impact on the public. They depend on aggregate consumption of a96
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certain commodity provided consumers disregard the effect of their
actions on the level of externalities.
We will assume that f is a twice differentiable, convex, and in-
creasing function.
Each consumer h [ H has a preference order defined over con-
sumption and pollution levels that is represented by a continuous twice
differentiable, strictly-quasi-concave utility function Uh (xh, z). Each
consumer h [ H solves a problem of utility maximization subject to a
budget constraint. For each consumer h [ H the indirect utility func-
tion is denoted by vh (q, mh, z).
3. Optimal Tax Rules
The problem considered by the government is the maximization of a
social welfare function of the type of Bergson-Samuelson
W (v1 (q, m1, z), v2 (q, m2, z),..., vH (q, mH, z))
subject to obtaining a given tax revenue R. The government budget
constraint is S S i h i i
h t x R ‡ . Let l be the shadow price associated with
this constraint. An additional constraint faced by the government is
the technology of generation of pollution.
Before showing the first order conditions of the government prob-
lem, we compute the derivative of the welfare function with respect to
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where ah is the marginal utility of income of h for h [ H, wh = dvh/dz,
and Roy’s Identity was used. For h [ H let bh = (dW/dvh)ah be the
direct social value of a unit of money given to h. We substitute the Slutsky
term for a change in the demand of the first commodity upon changes
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for h in the last term. Then from expresion (1) we obtain
dW
dt


















￿ S S b ' 1
1
(2)97
Optimal Tax Rules, Pigou Taxation, and the “Double Dividend”
where  ( ) W dW dv w z h
h h = S  is the change in social welfare due to a change
in the pollution level.
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= S S  be the change in tax revenue due to a unitary
change in the pollution level.
In (3) we substitute the Slutsky equation for changes in the de-
mand of commodity i due to changes in tk, and for 
dz
dtk
. Then the fol-
lowing expression is obtained
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as the effect in social welfare (excluding the effect on the externality)
of a monetary unit given to consumer h valued at shadow prices of
public revenue. This term is formed by: the direct effect, and the indi-98
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rect change in tax revenue induced by the income effect of the change



















as the effect in social welfare of a monetary unit given to consumer h
because of the implied change in emissions. This term has two parts:
(1) The direct effect on welfare due to induced changes in pollution
valued in terms of shadow prices of public revenue; and (2) the indi-
rect effect on tax revenue induced by the change in pollution.
If we substitute these expressions in (4), we obtain for k [ L
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for all k [ L. These are the first order conditions that have to satisfy
an optimal tax structure. These formulae are similar to those obtained
by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976). The differences are that they include
bz
h, meaning the welfare effect of the change in pollution due to giving
a unit of money to agent h. Also on the right hand side appears the
distortion on demand of the externality causing commodity.
These equations introduce criteria to design optimal taxes. The
effects on consumption distribution had to be taken into account and
consumption deviations should be smaller when commodities are
mostly consumed by consumers with greater bos. If the social welfare
function gives more weight to poorer people (b is greater for the poorer)
and the taxed commodity is mostly consumed by them, then the tax
rate should be lower. Therefore even though to have clean air is im-
portant, this is only one of the multiple objectives that policy-makers
can have. In some countries income distribution and extreme poverty
could be more important objectives.
At the same time we would have to compare the amount of distor-
tions in consumption (a good proxy is the first term of the right hand
side of the equation) with the effect on the pollution creating commod-99
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ity. The first term of the right hand side of the equation is directly
related with the harbergerian measure of the deadweight loss. Here
this is a function of the effect on consumption of the taxed commodity
and also of the effect on the commodities related with that one by the
terms of the Slutsky matrix. Therefore when we tax the first commod-
ity we have to consider the deviation of consumption caused on other
commodities.
The formulae also consider the effect of consumption distribution
between individuals through the bzs. It is important to identify who
are the greater marginal polluters. If, as would be reasonable to as-
sume (if we are considering a public bad), Wz and Tz are both nega-
tive, then distortions on goods consumed mainly by consumers with
large bz must be larger. This is because taxes on those commodities
would lead to larger reductions in social disutility due to pollution.
When we compute the optimal tax formulae, it is also considered
that by changing taxes on any commodity there are substitution ef-
fects and income effects. This means that if the first commodity is a
normal good then with any other tax we can change its consumption.
This effect could be reinforced by the substitution effect when the
taxed commodity is complementary of the first commodity or when
these commodities are substitutive and we are talking of a subsidy.
The relation between commodities related to the externality causing
good, given by the corresponding Slutsky term in order to design their
taxes, is also important.
This reasoning implies that taxes on goods different than the ex-
ternality creating ones will be different than they would be in the
absence of pollution. This would mean that the additivity property
does not generally hold in this model. Trivially, a sufficient condition
for the additivity property to hold is that the utility functions are sepa-
rable in pollution. So summarizing:
PROPOSITION 1: Unless the utility functions are separable in pollution,
the additivity property will not generally be satisfied.
4. Pigou Taxes versus Optimal Taxes
Another important remark is that the optimal tax of the first com-
modity is not necessarily a Pigou tax. The formula includes distribu-
tive considerations, of efficiency in taxation, of tax revenue, and of the100
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social evaluation of changing the level of pollution. It also includes
the fact that we can change the level of pollution by changing tax rates
on goods different than the first commodity. By changing taxes on the
first commodity we can also change the consumption levels of other
commodities changing welfare.
A Pigou tax in the first commodity would have the value t1 = –Wz.f9.
We are going to show that under certain conditions this would be the
value obtained from the optimal tax problem. The first of these condi-
tions is that all consumers share the same utility function and income
to avoid distributional problems. Then the social welfare function could
be the indirect utility function of a representative consumer. We also
need to assume that the externality causing commodity is not related
to other commodities with the substitution terms and that there are no
income effects. This is obtained when externalities are separable in
the utility function.
PROPOSITION 2: Assume that all consumers share the same utility func-
tion that is separable in pollution. Assume also that the marginal value
of public funds coincides with the marginal utility of income. Then the
optimal tax on the externality creating commodity is a Pigou tax.
PROOF: With these assumptions the derivative of the social welfare










dt 1 1 1 1
:= = +
Applying Roy’s identity and substituting Wz = dv/dz and f.9dx1/dt1
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The first order conditions of the optimal taxation problem are then
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so under the additional condition of the marginal value of private funds
(a) being equal to the marginal value of public funds (l) (condition101
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that means that the government is looking for Pareto optimum allo-
cations), t1 = –.Wzf9, as we wanted to show. y
The conditions for equivalence between optimal taxes on external-
ity causing goods and classical Pigou taxes are very restrictive. There
is no reason for that equivalence as soon as the government has dis-
tributive objectives, has to collect revenue for any other reason (so
shadow price of public revenue is different than shadow prices of pri-
vate income), or if the rest of goods are not separable from the exter-
nality causing good.
5. The Double Dividend
The double dividend proposition claims that a tax on an externality
causing good could reduce the externalities and also could give rev-
enue allowing for a reduction (in a revenue neutral way) on other
distortionary taxes. The different forms of the proposition and their
criticism have been surveyed by Goulder (1994). In this section we
present a different way of presenting and appraising the proposition
based on the tax model that we have presented.
Following Ahmad and Stern (1991) the marginal revenue cost of
changing a tax rate on a given commodity is given by the marginal
change in welfare due to the tax divided by the marginal change in
revenue due to the tax. In our model, for a tax on the externality






































so it has two parts. The first is the welfare loss due to taxation per
unit of public revenue. The second is the welfare gain because the
reduction of externalities per unit of revenue. For a tax on a different







































Goulder (1995) defines the strong form of the double dividend propo-
sition as: “The revenue neutral substitution of the environmental tax
for a typical or representative distortionary tax involves a zero or nega-
tive gross cost.” In our model of optimal taxation, this would be equiva-
lent to l l 1 £ k holding for every k.
The intermediate form of the double dividend proposition instead
is defined as: “It is possible to find a distortionary tax such that the
revenue neutral substitution of the environmental tax for this tax
involves a zero or negative gross cost.” In our model, what is required
is l l 1 £ k  to hold for at least one k „ 1.
Testing the double dividend proposition in any of its forms requires
the computation of the l for the different taxes. The data needed con-
sists of the parameters of a demand system and estimations of the
reduction in pollution and also of the willingness to pay for that re-
duction.
6. Final Remarks
In this paper we have shown conditions for the validity of the additiv-
ity property of optimal taxes in presence of externalities and for the
equivalence of Pigou taxes and optimal taxes. We also presented a
simple form based on our optimal tax rules to test the double dividend
proposition. This test could be done with household expenditure data
available for México, complemented with computations of the
willingnesses to pay for clean environment.
Obviously the model has important limitations that are shared
with other tax models of the type of Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976). The
production prices are assumed constant so perfect competition and
constant returns to scale (or a small international economy) are as-
sumed. Another important implicit assumption is that our model is
static. Environmental issues have a clear dynamic component.103
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